In this paper, we introduce the notion of Plausible Deniability in an information theoretic framework. We consider a scenario where an entity that eavesdrops through a broadcast channel summons one of the parties in a communication protocol to reveal their message (or signal vector). It is desirable that the summoned party have enough freedom to produce a fake output that is likely plausible given the eavesdropper's observation. We examine three variants of this problem -Message Deniability, Transmitter Deniability, and Receiver Deniability. In the first setting, the message sender is summoned to produce the sent message. Similarly, in the second and third settings, the transmitter and the receiver are required to produce the transmitted codeword, and the received vector respectively. For each of these settings, we examine the maximum communication rate that allows a given minimum rate of plausible fake outputs. For the Message and Transmitter Deniability problems, we fully characterise the capacity region for general broadcast channels, while for the Receiver Deniability problem, we give an achievable rate region for stochastically degraded broadcast channels.
I. Introduction
Communicating reliably and securely is increasingly being viewed as a challenging task in a world where the connected nature of communication networks make eavesdropping easier than ever before. Further, information leakage during communication may have a wide range of consequences depending on the usage scenario -for a patient transmitting their medical data, the leakage may amount to loss of privacy, while for a whistleblower, this may have dire (even life-threatening) consequences. These concerns have given rise to a wide variety of secure communication protocols -two notable paradigms being the cryptographic approach [1] and the informationtheoretic approach [2] , [3] . In a typical such system, the sender encrypts the message using a previously agreed upon protocol and the receiver decrypts it accordingly, while simultaneously guaranteeing that the maximum amount of potential information that would be leaked to the eavesdropper is bounded by a security or equivocation parameter.
We argue that in the above protocols, it is often assumed the eavesdropper may passively or actively eavesdrop on the transcript, but never communicates directly with the sender or the receiver. However, as often seen in the case of the whistleblower, in addition to observing the communication, the eavesdropping entity can also actively interact with the sender * Mayank Bakshi (mayank@inc.cuhk.edu.hk) is affiliated with the Institute of Network Coding, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. The work described in this paper was partially supported by a grant from University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China ( or receiver and force them to divulge either the message or the codeword. In this situation, it is desirable that the whistleblower be able to protect his or her right to free speech and produce a fake message (or codeword) with as little dependence on the true message (or codeword) as possible, while also appearing to be truthful with respect to the eavesdropper's observation.
The following example highlights how this requirement differs from the usual notion of secrecy.
Example (Secrecy does not guarantee freedom of expression). Consider the setting of Figure 1 . Since the channel to Bob is noiseless, the secrecy capacity [3] is p. On the other hand, even if Alice and Bob operate a code equipped with an information-theoretic secrecy guarantee and Judy demands that Alice provide the transmitted codeword x, Alice has no choice but to provide exactly what was transmitted (and hence, also reveal the message). If Alice chooses to provide a vector x different from x, then Judy would be able to detect with a constant probability that Alice is lying since the transmitted symbol for any coordinate where x and x differ would be received correctly by Judy with probability 1 − p.
The above example shows that secrecy with respect to eavesdropping may not be sufficient when one of the communicating parties is summoned to reveal their observations. Recognising this limitation, the notion of Plausible Deniability [4] , has recently garnered much attention in the cryptographic community. Generally speaking, communication schemes based on this principle allow the summoned party to pretend deniability by responding with a fake message while simultaneously appearing to be plausible with respect to any eavesdropping. By now there are both good algorithms [5] , [6] as well as practical implementations [7] of this principle that rely on computational assumptions on the eavesdropper.
In this work, we examine Plausible Deniability in an information theoretic setting and allow all parties to be computationally unbounded. Our general setup is as follows. Alice, Bob, and Charlie are three participants in a potentially secretive communication setup. Charlie wishes to send a message m ∈ M to Bob through Alice. Alice and Bob are at two ends of a noisy channel and operate the physical layer with Alice being the transmitter and Bob being the receiver, while Charlie interacts directly with Alice and knows the message but does not partake in the physical layer transmission and reception. The nature of the message may either be an innocuous or a secretive one -this is known to Alice, Bob, and Charlie, but not to any eavesdroppers.
Judy is an eavesdropper who observes a noisy version of Alice's transmission. In this work, we assume that the statistics of Judy's observation are known to the above three parties, but the exact observation is unknown. We consider three settings for this problem. In the Transmitter Deniability problem, Judy may summon Alice and ask her to produce the transmitted codeword. Similarly, in the Receiver Deniability, and the Message Deniability problems, Judy may summon Bob, and Charlie, to produce the received vector, and the message, respectively. In each of these settings, depending on whether the communication is innocuous or secretive, the summoned party may either respond truthfully or use a Faking Procedure to produce a fake output that reveals as little information about the true message as possible while still maintaining plausibility with respect to Judy's observation.
We quantify the efficacy of a communication scheme in terms of its two properties -the reliability of the code and the plausible deniability of the faking procedure. The first property i.e., the reliability is measured in a standard fashion in terms of the message rate and the error probability at the decoder. Plausible deniability is also measured in terms of two metrics -the plausibility and the rate of deniability. Roughly speaking, plausibility measures the closeness between two distributionsthe joint distribution of the fake output with the eavesdropper's observation and that of the true message or signal vector with the eavesdropper's observation. We measure this distance in terms of the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence. 1, 2 The rate of deniability is measured as the conditional entropy of the fake message given the summoned party's observations. This attempts to capture the amount of freedom the summoned party has while responding to the summons. The rate of deniability may also be roughly interpreted as a measure of equivocation at the eavesdropper after the summoned party is forced to respond. 3 We remark here that demanding a rate of deniability D is a stronger requirement than demanding an equivocation D in the usual information theoretic secrecy setting -this naturally extends similar observations in the 1 The K-L divergence between two probability measures P 1 and P 2 over a set A is defined as D(P 1 ||P 2 ) a∈A P 1 (a) log 2 P 1 (a) P 2 (a) . 2 Even though here we measure the plausibility in terms of K-L divergence, one is also well justified to instead use other measures of distance such as the variational distance. While the latter has a more natural interpretation in terms of Hypothesis Testing (since the variational distance between two probability measures equals 1 − Pr(False Alarm) − Pr(Missed Detection)), Pinsker's inequality shows that plausible deniability in the K-L sense implies plausible deniability in the hypothesis testing sense. 3 Strictly speaking, our formal definition of the rate of deniability is not the same as that of equivocation -a rate of deniability D implies that the equivocation is at least D, but not vice versa. However, when the faking procedure satisfies the plausibility requirement, an approximate equivalence between these two notions is made precise by Lemmas 1 and 3.
Here, we show setup (A), i.e., message deniability. Setups (B) and (C) are similarly obtained by altering the output of the faking procedure Fake(·) and the party that is summoned. cryptographic setting where, a plausibly deniable protocol trivially also satisfies the security requirement. The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we formally describe our notation and problem formulation and state the main results in Section III. In Sections IV and V, we give proof sketches for our theorems. Finally, in Section VI, we provide concluding remarks.
II. Problem Formulation a) Notation: Throughout this paper, we typically adopt the following notation. Upper case math and lower case symbols such as X and x denote random variables and their specific values respectively. Boldface symbols such as X and x denote random vectors and their specific values respectively, while calligraphic symbols such as X denote sets. Probability distributions of generic random variables is typically written as P (e.g. P X , P Y|X ), while probability distributions imposed by the specific codebook are typically written as Q (e.g. Q X ). b) Channel model: Alice, Bob, and Judy are connected through the following memoryless broadcast channel -at any time instant, Alice's transmission X ∈ X , Bob's reception Y ∈ Y , and Judy's observation Z ∈ Z follow the conditional distribution P Y,Z|X over finite alphabets X × Y × Z . Initially, only Charlie knows the message m ∈ M and passes it onto Alice to be transmitted to Bob over the broadcast channel. Charlie only knows the value of the message, but does not see the channel inputs or outputs. There is no shared randomness, but Alice, Bob, and Charlie have private randomness k A ∈ K , k B ∈ K , and k C ∈ K respectively. In addition, the code and the faking procedure (defined in the following) are known to all parties. c) Codes: A code is a pair of maps (Enc, Dec) which are applied by Alice and Bob to generate the codeword x x n = Enc(m, k A ) and the reconstruction m = Dec(y) respectively. When there is no private randomness at Alice, we denote the codeword for message m by x(m). To simplify notation, we represent a code (Enc, Dec) through its codebook C {Enc(m, k A ) : m ∈ M , k A ∈ K }. 4 We say that C is ( , R)reliable if 1 n log 2 |M | ≥ R, and there exists an encoder and decoder pair (Enc, Dec) such that Q M,X,Y (M M) < . d) Plausible deniability: Judy may summon Alice, Bob, or Charlie to provide a variable w ∈ W that can be used to reconstruct the message using a map Msg : W → M . Depending on whether or not the transmission is an innocuous, the summoned party may either reveal the true value of w or use a faking procedure Fake(·) that accepts as input the true value w along with any private randomness, to output a fake value w (f) ∈ W . We characterize a faking procedure through its plausibility δ and the deniability rate D. In general, we say that W (f) is (δ, D)-plausibly deniable for W given observation Z if 1 n H(Msg(W (f) )|W) ≥ D, and D(Q Z,W (f) ||Q Z,W ) ≤ δ. In the various settings considered in this paper, w equals x, y, or m. The three settings we consider in this paper are: (A) Message deniability: As shown in Figure 2 , Charlie is the summoned party, w = m, W = M , and Msg(w) = w. (B) Transmitter deniability: Here, Alice is the summoned party, w = x, W = X n , and Msg(w) is the most likely message given that x = w. 5 (C) Receiver deniability: Here, Bob is the summoned party, w = y, W = Y n , and Msg(w) = Dec(w). e) Capacity regions: For each setting w ∈ {m, x, y}, we say that a rate-deniability pair (R, D) is achievable if for any , δ > 0 and for large enough n, there exists a blocklength-n code C that is ( , R)-reliable and a faking procedure Fake(·) that is (δ, D)-plausibly deniable for W given Z. The capacity region R w is the closure of the set of all achievable rate-deniability pairs. 
III. Main Results

IV. Message Deniability
In this section, we outline the proof of Theorem 1. Due to the standard nature of the achievability proof, we only give a proof sketch here, and instead focus mainly on the converse. Our achievability argument relies on reducing our problem to the following information theoretic secrecy problem. Secrecy with side information at the eavesdropper: Consider the setup shown in Figure 3 . Alice observes independent sources s ∈ {0, 1} nR s and t ∈ {0, 1} nR t and wishes to transmit them reliably to Bob over n uses of the channel. Judy observes 5 If there are more than one message values that attain the highest likelihood for the message given that x = w, then Msg(w) selects one of them arbitrarily.
(ŝ,t) = Dec(y)
/ / Judy s =? Fig. 3 . Any code for the above secrecy problem can be operated as a code for the Message Deniability problem by treating s as the part of the message that the faking algorithm randomizes over and t as the part of the message that is unchanged by it.
a noisy version of the transmission and knows the source t as side information. The goal for the transmission is to ensure that the leakage I(S; Z|T) is small. 6 Following similar arguments as [3] , all rate pairs (R s , R t ) such that R s ≤ I(U; Y|V)−I(U; Z|V),
A. Proof sketch of achievability of Theorem 1
The crux of the achievability proof is the following reduction argument. For the message deniability problem, we decompose the nR-length message m into two parts -a confidential part m c of nR s bits, and a public part m p of nR t bits. Next, Alice and Bob encode and decode (m c , m p ) using a reliable code (Enc s,t , Dec s,t ) for the above mentioned secrecy problem. The reliability guarantees for our code thus follow directly. The faking procedure draws M c uniformly at random {0, 1} nR s and outputs (M c , m p ). Based on the information leakage guarantees of the code (Enc s,t , Dec s,t ), we conclude that the plausible deniability requirement is satisfied with R = R s +R t and D = R s .
B. Proof of converse in Theorem 1
Before stating the formal proof, we state the following lemma. 
Proof:
We explicitly only prove the first inequality. The second inequality follow from a similar reasoning.
(1) 6 In contrast to [3] , Judy is not interested in estimating t based on z, but is instead provided with t as side-information. This allows us to operate at potentially higher rates than [3] .
In the above, (a) follows by using the fact that M (f) is (δ, D)plausible deniable for M given Z to bound the first term in (1), noting that P M (m) equals 1/|M | to conclude that the second term is zero, and applying the non-negativity of the Kullback-Leibler divergence. The inequality (b) is obtained by using Jensen's inequality. Finally, (c) follows applying Pinsker's inequality to bound the variational distance between the distributions Q Z,M (f) and Q Z,M .
Proof of converse of Theorem 1:
We begin by obtaining n-letter bounds on D and R for any ( , R)-reliable and (δ, D)-plausibly deniable code. To this end, from the definition and Lemma 1, there exists γ = γ( , δ) > 0 such that lim ( ,δ)→(0,0) γ = 0, and
Next, from Fano's inequality, 
where the second equality follows from the fact that M (f) −M−Y is a Markov chain. Next, we obtain single-letter versions of the above expressions. Let T be uniformly distributed over [1 : n] and independent of (M, M (f) , X, Y, Z). From (2),
, M (f) ) + 3γ where (a) follows from Csiszár's sum identity [8] . Also,
Finally, let V = (M (f) , Y T −1 , Z n T +1 , T ), U = (V, M), X = X T , Y = Y T and Z = Z T . Then, clearly, V−U−X−(Y, Z). Substituting above gives the claimed theorem.
V. Transmitter and Receiver deniability
A. Zero Information Variables
For a random variable W ∼ P W and a channel P Z|W , we define the following relation: for w 1 , w 2 ∈ W , we say that w 1 ∼ w 2 if P Z|W (z|w 1 ) = P Z|W (z|w 2 ), for all z ∈ Z . It is evident that this is an equivalence relation. Let U 0 represent the set of equivalence classes of this relation. We define the zero-information random variable U 0 of W w.r.t. P Z|W as a random variable taking values in U 0 and is such that W ∈ U 0 . Clearly, U 0 is a function of W. Note that U 0 − W − Z (since U 0 is a function of W) and W − U 0 − Z (by definition). For each w ∈ W , we will call the corresponding u 0 its zero-information symbol. The following lemma follows from standard properties of mutual information and shows that for achieving the rates claimed in Theorems 2 and 3, it suffices to restrict our auxiliary random variables to the corresponding zero information variables. This is critical in our proofs later in this section. 
B. Transmitter Deniability
We begin our proof for Theorem 2 by stating two lemmas from [9] that lead to our converse arguments. Lemma 3 follows from arguments similar to Lemma 1. Next, Lemma 4 follows from a standard chain of information inequalities with Lemma 3 as the starting point and single-letterizing the resulting expressions.
Lemma 3.
Let X (f) be (δ, D)-plausibly deniable for X given Z and X (f) − X − Z. Then, there exists a constant κ depending only on P Z|X such that 
Proof of Theorem 2:
The converse for Theorem 2 follows from Lemma 4 by applying standard continuity arguments (see [9] ) to show that the bounds on R and D satisfy the theorem statement as δ vanishes. We now give a proof sketch for the achievability of claimed rate region. To this end, choose random variables (X, U) satisfying the conditions in the theorem with U as the zero information variable of X w.r.t. P Z|X . Recall that Lemma 2 guarantees the optimality of such an U.
We consider a two layer random code. For any > 0, first, C = {u(1), . . . , u(2 n(I(X;U)− ) )} is generated by drawing each u i ( j) independently from the distribution P U . Next, for each u ∈ C , a sub-code C u = {x(u, 1), . . . , x(u, 2 n(I(X;Y|U)− ) )} is generated by drawing each x i (u, j) independently from the distribution P X|U (·|u i ). The codebook C = {x (C ) (m) : m ∈ M } is formed by taking the union ∪ u∈C C u . Finally, the faking procedure simply accepts the transmitted codeword (say, x) and outputs a uniformly drawn codeword from the sub-code that contains x (say, C u ).
The reliability of the above code follows from standard arguments for superposition coding (see [8] for example). The plausible deniability for the code follows directly from the construction by noting that for every x ∈ C u , u is precisely the sequence of the zero information symbols of x w.r.t. P Z|X . Thus, for any x, x ∈ C U and z ∈ Z n , Q X|Z (x|z) = Q X|Z (x |z).
C. Receiver Deniability
Proof of Theorem 3:
Let > 0 and set R = I(X; Y) − ρ for some ρ > . Consider the following codebook and faking procedure.
a) Codebook generation: The codebook C = {x (C ) (m) : m ∈ M } is generated by drawing each x (C ) i (m) independently from the distribution P X . Let Pr C be the probability distribution over the random generation of the codebook. b) Decoding: Upon receiving y, the decoder looks for m ∈ M such that (x (C ) (m), y) are jointly typical. c) Faking procedure: Given y, the faking procedure first generates the unique v where, for each i, v i represents the zero information symbol of y i w.r.t. P Z|Y . Next, Y (f) is drawn from Y n according to the conditional distribution Q Y (f) |V = Q Y|V . Note that Y (f) − V − (Y, X, Z) is a Markov chain. For similar reasons as in transmitter deniability, these ensure that the parameter δ is zero. Specifically, under the assumption of stochastic degradedness of
The reliability analysis is similar to Shannon's channel coding theorem. Next, assuming that the average error probability for the code C is no larger than , the following chain of inequalities give a lower bound on D for the code C . 
In the above, the second equality in (4) follows from the faking procedure inducing Q Y (f) |V = Q Y|V , the fact that V is a function of Y, and the Markov chain Y (f) − V − Y. Fano's inequality implies (5) . Note that the above bound is a multi-letter bound that depends on the specific codebook C . Finally, a single letter bound follows from concentration arguments over the codebook generation process [9] .
VI. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have considered three different models of Plausible Deniability and give achievable rates for each model while also giving tight converses for the message deniability and transmitter deniability settings. It is evident that, at the very least, each capacity region is a subset of the Rate-Equivocation region defined in [3] . The argument for this claim is roughly the following -any code that has a rate of deniability D has the property that the equivocation at the eavesdropper is at least D (otherwise, with high probability, the eavesdropper can detect a fake response). On the other hand, it is not a priori clear whether the achievable rates for any one model considered in this paper is a subset of another -part of the difficulty in comparing the different settings arises from the fact that in each setting, the faking procedure accepts different inputs to generate the fake output.
A potential drawback of our Transmitter and Receiver Deniability results is that non-zero rates are possible only when non-trivial zero information variables exists. We note that the existence of such variables is guaranteed only for fairly special classes of channels -even for channels such as Binary Symmetric Channels, the only zero information variables are the channel inputs themselves. Further, the existence of non-trivial zero information variables may be rather fragile with respect to even slight perturbations in the channel conditional probability. However, even where non-zero rates are not possible, an asymptotically vanishing rate of communication may still possible over some channels, perhaps similarly to the "squareroot law" observed in LPD communications [10] , [11] .
